MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................629A. Procedural Background ................................................6291. Serverside's Delaware action .....................................6292. Procedural landmarks in the Iowa action ...........................630B. Factual Background .....6311. The patents-in-suit ...............................................6312. Undisputed and disputed claim terms ...............................6383. The claims at issue ..............................................641II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ............................................................644A. Undisputed Claim Terms ...............................................644B. Disputed Claim Terms .................................................6441. Standards For Patent Claim Construction ...........................645a. Function and types of claims ..................................645b. The two-step patent infringement analysis .....................646c. The claim construction process ................................647i. Consideration of the claims and the specification .......647ii. The doctrine of "claim differentiation" ................648iii. The relationship between construction and the "definiteness" requirement ............................648iv. The role of prosecution history .........................649v. The role of dictionaries and other sources ..............649d. The ultimate standard .........................................6502. "Customer identifier corresponding to the remote customer" ........650a. Proposed constructions ........................................650b. Arguments of the parties ......................................650c. Rejection of the Iowa Defendants' construction ................651i. The "uniqueness"requirement .............................651ii. Exclusion of a randomly generated alphanumeric code ..................................................653iii. Exclusion of generation using information provided by the customer .......................................653iv. Transformation on a customer's financial account information ...........................................654d. Rejection of Serverside's construction ........................655e. The tentative construction ....................................6553. "Secure unique identifier" .........................................657a. Proposed constructions ........................................657b. Arguments of the parties ......................................658c. Rejection of the parties' constructions ......................659d. The tentative construction ....................................660
4. "Encrypted customer information" ...................................662a. Proposed constructions ........................................662b. Arguments of the parties ......................................662c. Rejection of the parties' constructions ......................663d. The tentative construction ....................................664i. Encryption .............................................664ii. Customer information ....................................665iii. The composite construction ..............................665C. Summary Of Tentative Constructions ...................................666D. The Markman Hearing ..................................................6681. Additional evidence and the parties'positions .....................6682. Insertion of the "unique" limitation ..............................670a. Arguments at the hearing ......................................670b. Analysis ......................................................6723. Insertion of the "not a randomly generated alphanumeric code" limitation ......................................................675a. Additional background ........................................676i. The Tuchler prior art ....................................676ii. The prosecution history ..................................680b. Arguments at the hearing ......................................683c. Analysis ......................................................685i. Disclaimer as to "encrypted customer information" ........685ii. Disclaimer as to "customer identifiers" generally ........687III. CONCLUSION ...............................................................690
I sometimes wonder if patent attorneys — and attorneys generally — turn off their sense of humor when they get into litigation. For example, in the TV series Big Bang Theory, when the following conversation occurs among Howard Wolowitz, an engineer, Dr. Sheldon Cooper, a theoretical physicist, and Penny, a waitress and aspiring actress, while the gang is at a hospital waiting for news about what caused Howard's mother to collapse, we all know why it's funny:
On the other hand, when the plaintiffs' patent attorneys argue in written submissions prior to a Markman hearing
On June 22, 2011, plaintiffs Serverside Group Limited and Serverside Graphics, Inc., collectively "Serverside," filed the original Complaint in this patent infringement action, against fifteen defendants, in
On February 17, 2012, United States District Court Judge Richard Andrews entered a Memorandum Opinion in the Delaware action, in response to motions by several of the defendants, in which he concluded, inter alia, that the claims against defendants Tactical 8 Technologies, L.L.C., and Bank of Iowa Corporation, collectively "the Iowa Defendants," should be transferred to this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). That same day, Judge Andrews also entered a separate Order transferring the claims against the Iowa Defendants to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
After this action was transferred to this district, it was initially assigned to Chief United States District Court Judge Linda R. Reade. On March 14, 2012, the Iowa Defendants filed a joint Answer (docket no. 96), in this court, to Serverside's Complaint, denying Serverside's patent infringement claims against them. On April 18, 2012, United States Magistrate Judge Jon S. Scoles filed a Scheduling Order, Discovery Plan, And Order On Miscellaneous Pretrial Matters (Scheduling Order) (docket no. 112). Among other things, the Scheduling Order set requirements for various submissions concerning claim construction and set a Markman hearing on claim construction for February 22, 2013. On April 19, 2012, Chief Judge Reade entered an Order Setting Civil Jury Trial, Final Pretrial Conference, And Requirements For The Proposed Final Pretrial Order (Trial Setting Order) (docket no. 113), scheduling the trial in this matter for the two-week period beginning on January 21, 2014. On April 19, 2012, Chief Judge Reade also entered an Order (docket no. 114), prescribing the format for the claim chart for claim construction required in the Scheduling Order.
On August 29, 2012, Chief Judge Reade entered an Order (docket no. 117) reassigning this case to me. On November 13, 2012, I entered an Order Clarifying Trial Date, Resetting Final Pretrial Conference Time, And Stating New Requirements For Final Pretrial Order (Amended Trial Setting Order) (docket no. 120), reiterating that the trial is scheduled to begin during the two-week period beginning on January 21, 2014, but modifying other requirements for trial preparation.
My changing schedule required me to reset the Markman hearing, more than once, from the date originally set in the Scheduling Order. The Markman hearing was finally reset for February 20, 2013, by Order (docket no. 122) filed December 20, 2012. The following day, December 21, 2012, the parties filed their Joint Claim Terms Submission (docket no. 123), pursuant to the Scheduling Order, identifying the construction of nine claim terms of the patents-in-suit as "undisputed," and only three claim terms as "disputed." They offered profoundly different constructions of the three "disputed" terms, however.
On January 18, 2013, the Iowa Defendants filed their Claim Construction Brief (docket no. 124), to which they attached, as Exhibit 1, a copy of the '199 patent; as Exhibit 2, a copy of the '490 patent; as Exhibit 3, a portion of the prosecution history of the '199 patent (Amendments To The Claims, Attorney Docket No. 086887-0052, to Application No. 12/954,277); as
As I have done in other patent infringement cases, see Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 498 F.Supp.2d 1131, 1136 (N.D.Iowa 2007); Maytag Corp. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 411 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1015-16 (N.D.Iowa 2006); TransAmerica Life Ins. Co. v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 550 F.Supp.2d 865 (N.D.Iowa 2008), on February 18, 2013, a few days before the Markman hearing, I provided the parties with a Tentative Draft of this Memorandum Opinion And Order Regarding Construction Of Disputed Patent Claim Terms, based on the parties' written submissions concerning claim construction. In the past, I have found that such a procedure was very effective in focusing the parties' arguments on true disputes about construction of pertinent claim terms as well as on specific parts of my tentative claim constructions where the parties believed that I had gone wrong. The parties in the prior patent cases appeared to agree, because they recommended that I follow such a procedure for rendering Markman decisions in future patent cases. It was my hope that doing so in this case would achieve some of the same benefits, and I was not disappointed.
On February 20, 2013, I held a Markman hearing, at which Serverside was represented by Michael A. Albert of Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, P.C., in Boston, Massachusetts, and local counsel Glenn Johnson of Nyemaster Goode, P.C., in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and the Iowa Defendants were represented by Michael A. Dee and Brian Pringel of Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross, Baskerville & Schoenebaum, P.L.C., in Des Moines, Iowa. The Markman hearing consisted of oral argument and submission, by the Iowa Defendants, of additional documentary evidence, described in more detail in Section II.D. The parties' arguments were clear, cogent, and presented with consummate professionalism.
The issues of claim construction are now fully submitted.
As noted above, Severside alleges that the Iowa Defendants are infringing certain claims of two of Severside's patents. Those two patents are U.S. Patent No. 7,931,199 (the '199 patent), issued April 26, 2011, and entitled "Computerized Card Production Equipment," and U.S. Patent No. 7,946,490 (the '490 patent), issued
The Abstract initially explains, rather opaquely, that "[a]n apparatus and method for manipulating images is disclosed." A somewhat more helpful general explanation of the invention is provided by the Technical Field, which adds,
'199 Patent, Technical Field, 1:25-30. In its Opening Brief, Serverside explains the invention, if not more succinctly, perhaps more helpfully, as follows:
Severside's Opening Brief at 1.
I find the following excerpt from the Detailed Description to be helpful to a general understanding of the claimed invention:
'199 Patent, Detailed Description, 9:54-10:11.
Thus, to put the description of the invention in plain English — a dangerous endeavor when faced with patents and patent attorneys — the invention allows customers to use a secure process on the internet to select personalized images, which are printed on their bank credit or debit cards, even if the customer, the images, the image manipulation software, the customer's account information, and the card printer are all in different locations.
After the initial, rather opaque description of the invention in the Abstract, quoted above, the Abstract describes generally two of the possible embodiments according to the invention. The figure that appears with the Abstract of the '199 patent is actually Figure
A much more detailed description of this embodiment appears in the Detailed Description at 12:19-64. Figure
The figure that appears with the Abstract of the '490 patent is actually Figure
Again, a much more detailed description of this embodiment appears in the Detailed Description at 10:62-12:18. Figure
It may also be helpful to include here two other figures that illustrate two additional embodiments of the claimed invention, Figures
'199 Patent, Brief Description Of The Drawings, 8:1-4 (emphasis added). A much more detailed description of the embodiment
As the Brief Description Of The Drawings also explains,
'199 Patent, Brief Description Of The Drawings, 8:5-10 (emphasis added). A
I believe that identifying the "undisputed" and "disputed" claim terms — albeit without the parties' supporting comments or citations — will help clarify the claims of the two patents-in-suit that Serverside alleges that the Iowa Defendants are infringing, when I set out the claims at issue below. I begin with the nine undisputed claim terms.
UNDISPUTED CLAIM TERMS Relevant No. Claim Term/Phrase Claim(s) Agreed Construction 1 "financial transaction card" '199: 1, 2, 9, "a transaction card (e.g., credit 14-16 18, card, debit card, ATM card, or similar 22, 25, 29 card), but not a prepaid bearer '490: 1, 2, 9, card" 14-16, 18, 22, 25, 29-31 2 "financial record of the remote '199: 1 '490 "record of financial information of customer that personalized the image" 1 the customer that personalized the image" 3 "one-way code" '199: 1 "a hash value created from customer information" 4 "image processing means for providing '490: 30-31 Means plus function term, with the an image, produced based function being "providing an image, on said instructions for manipulation, based on instructions for manipulation, for application to the for application to the financial financial transaction card" transaction card," and the associated structure being "an image processor (see, e.g., back end software 110 and image manipulation emulator 256)" 5 "means for embedding the customer '199: 25 Means plus function term, with the identifier in the personalized '490: 25 function being "embedding the customer image" identifier in the personalized image" and the associated structure being "a back end server (such as server 1103 or 1203) that embeds the customer identifier in the personalized image, for example by embedding the identifier in a bar code, machine readable code, or metadata" 6 "computer program means for presenting '199: 30 The three phrases are means plus to a remote customer the '490: 30-31 function claim terms, with the function remote user interface" being "presenting to a remote customer or remote user a user interface" and the associated structure being "a user interface (see, e.g., front end software 105 and Figs. 3-10)" "computer program means for presenting to a remote customer a user interface" "computer program means for presenting to a remote user an user interface" 7 "image instruction means for receiving '199: 30 The phrase is a means plus function instructions for '490: 30-31 claim term, with the function being
manipulation of an image file" "receiving instructions for manipulation of an image file" and the associated structure being "an image compilation server coupled to a communications link (see, e.g., image compilation server 108)" (The language following this phrase differs somewhat in the 3 claims where it appears.) 8 "an identifier selected from a secure '199: 1 "a customer identifier that is chosen unique identifier and a one-way from one of two available options: code" a secure unique identifier or a one-way code" 9 "instructions defining said plurality '199: 29 "instructions for implementing all of manipulations applied to the '490: 29 of the manipulations that a remote graphical representation" user applies to a graphical representation on a remote terminal"
The three disputed claim terms and the parties' proposed constructions are set out below, again without the parties' comments or supporting citations.
DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS Iowa Serverside's Defendants' Claim Relevant Proposed Proposed No. Term/Phrase Claim(s) Construction Construction 1 "customer identifier '199: 1-4, No construction "a unique code, but that corresponds to the 6-8, 10-13, required. not a randomly generated remote customer that 15, 17-18, alphanumeric personalized said 20-21, 24-28 code, generated by image" performing a transformation on a customer's financial account information, such as the customer's name or account number, but not generated using information provided by the customer" '490: 1-4, If construed, then: "customer identifier 6-8, 10-13, "information used to corresponding to the 15, 17-18, identify the remote remote customer"/"customer 20-21, 24-28, customer or user" identifier 30-31 that corresponds to the remote customer" "unique identifier corresponding to the remote user" 2 "secure unique '199: 1 No construction required. Indefinite. identifier" If construed, then: In the alternative, if "unique identifier which not indefinite: "encrypted is secure" customer information"
3 "encrypted customer '490: 1, 29-31 No construction "a unique code, but not information"/"encrypted required. a randomly generated remote user alphanumeric code, generated within a secure environment by performing a transformation a customer's financial account information If construed, then "customer or remote user information which has been encrypted or encoded"
Serverside accuses the Iowa Defendants of directly and indirectly infringing claims
PATENT CLAIMS ALLEGEDLY INFRINGED '199 Patent Claims '490 Patent Claims What is claimed is: What is claimed is:1. Computerized financial transaction card1. Computerized financial transaction card production equipment operable to apply one production equipment operable to apply one or more personalized images to a financial or more personalized images to a financial transaction card, the production equipment transaction card, the production equipment comprising: comprising: a module configured to receive a personalized a module configured to receive a personalized image of a customer, the image being image of a customer, the image being received from an image processor computer received from an image processor computer arranged to facilitate image personalization arranged to facilitate image personalization by remote customers; by remote customers; a module configured to receive a customer a module configured to receive a customer identifier that corresponds to the remote identifier that corresponds to the remote customer customer that personalized said image; that personalized said image; a module configured to receive a financial a module configured to receive a financial record of the remote customer that personalized record of the remote customer that personalized the image; the image; a card printer arranged to print images on a card printer arranged to print images on card material and equipment configured to card material and equipment configured to apply financial information from the financial apply financial information from the financial record to the card material; and record to the card material; and a controller operable, based on said customer a controller operable, based on said customer identifier, to cause printing of said personalized identifier, to cause printing of said personalized customer image onto the card material and customer image onto the card material to cause application of relevant financial and to cause application of relevant financial information from the financial record onto information from the financial record onto the card material, the card material; wherein the customer identifier comprises wherein the customer identifier encompassesan identifier selected from a secure unique encrypted customer information. identifierand a one-way code. 2. Computerized financial transaction card2. [Identical] production equipment as in claim 1, wherein
said image processor computer is arranged to provide the personalized image in association with the relevant customer identifier, and wherein the module configured to receive the image is configured to also receive the associated customer identifier. 9. Computerized financial transaction card9. [Identical] production equipment as in claim 1, wherein equipment configured to apply financial information from the financial record to the card material comprises an encoder.14. Computerized financial transaction card14. [Identical] production equipment as in claim 1, wherein the image processor computer is arranged to facilitate customer upload of images for personalization.15. Computerized financial transaction card15. [Identical] production equipment as in claim 14, wherein the image processor computer comprises code for assigning the customer identifier to a login session of a customer.16. Computerized financial transaction card16. [Identical] production equipment as in claim 1, wherein the image processor computer is arranged to facilitate customer selection of images from an image library.18. Computerized financial transaction card18. [Identical] production equipment as in claim 1, configured to connect to a computer system of a card issuer comprising a module to generate the customer identifier.22. Computerized financial transaction card22. [Identical] production equipment as in claim 1, wherein the equipment performing application of financial information from the financial record to the card material comprises an encoder for encoding a magnetic strip of the card with financial information from the financial record.25. Computerizedfinancial transaction 25. [Identical]card production equipment as in claim1, wherein the image processor computer comprises meansfor embedding the customer identifierin the personalized image. 29. Computer apparatus for producing personalized29. A computer system for producing personalizedfinancial transaction cards, thefinancial transaction cards, the computer computer apparatus comprising: system comprising: a server for generating a browser-based a server for generating a browser-based user interface for displaying on a remote user interface for displaying on a remote terminal a graphical representation of at terminal a graphical representation of at least a portion of an image, said interface least a portion of an image, said interface being capable of effecting a plurality of manipulations being capable of effecting a plurality of manipulations to the graphical representation; to the graphical representation; an internet communications link coupling an internet communications link coupling the remote user interface to an image processor, the remote user interface to an image processor, said link being operable to receive said link being operable to receive instructions defining said plurality of manipulations instructionsdefining said plurality of manipulations
applied to the graphical representation applied to the graphical representationfrom the remote terminal; from the remote terminal; an image processor operable to access the an image processor operable to access the image to apply manipulations emulating image to apply manipulations emulating those applied to the graphical representation those applied to the graphical representation according to the instructions; and according to the instructions; the computerizedfinancial transaction card financial transaction card production production equipment of claim1 operable to equipment operable to apply the resulting apply the resulting image to afinancial image to afinancial transaction card; andtransaction card. the image being associated with a user identifier comprising encrypted customer information.30. The computer apparatus of claim 29,30. A system for operating a computer to further comprising: facilitate production of a personalized financial transaction card, the system comprising:computer program means for presenting computer program means for presenting to ato a remote customer the remoteuser interface; remote customer a user interface; andimage instruction means for receiving instructions image instruction means for receiving instructions for manipulation of an image for manipulation of an image file, the instructions being based on manipulationsfile, the instructions being based on manipulations performed by the remote customer performed by the remote customer with regard to a representative version, on with regard to a representative version, on the remote user interface, of the image that the user interface, of the image that is contained is contained in the file. in the file;image processing means for providing an image, produced based on said instructions for manipulation, for application to the financial transaction card, the image being associated with a customer identifier corresponding to the remote customer, and wherein the customer identifier comprises encrypted customer information. [No Claim 31]31. A system for operating a computer to facilitate production of a personalizedfinancial transaction card, the system comprising:computer program means for presenting to a remote user an user interface; image instruction means for receiving instructions for manipulation of an image file, the instructions being based on manipulations performed by the remote user with regard to a representative version, on the user interface, of the image that is contained in the file;image processing means for providing an image, produced based on said instructions for manipulation, for application to the financial transaction card, the image being associated with an unique identifier corresponding to the remote user, wherein the unique identifier is used to obtain the associated image and provide it to a printer for printing the image on to the blank card material, and wherein the customer identifier comprises encrypted remote user information.
As noted above, the Delaware court has already construed several terms of the patents-in-suit, and the parties have adopted here that court's constructions of seven claim terms. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has observed,
Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed.Cir.2008). Likewise, here, "[i]n the interest of uniformity and correctness, this court consults the claim analysis of [the Delaware court] on the identical terms in the context of the same patent" in this separate Markman proceeding. Cf. id. Here, I see no reason to depart from the constructions by the Delaware court of identical terms in the context of the same patent. Moreover, I have not found the Delaware court's constructions to be lacking in support in the language of the claims, specifications, or prosecution history of the patents, which might have given me a reason to depart from its constructions.
As to the remaining two "undisputed" terms, the parties have agreed between themselves on the constructions of those terms. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, "[W]here, as here, the parties agree to a claim construction that is adopted by the district court, and neither party disputes that construction on appeal, we decline to raise an issue sua sponte that the parties have not presented." WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1347 n. 2 (Fed.Cir. 1999). Likewise, here, where the parties have agreed on certain constructions, and neither party now disputes those constructions, I decline to raise an issue sua sponte that the parties have not presented. Moreover, I have not found the parties' agreed constructions to be lacking in support in the language of the claims, specifications, or prosecution history of the patents, which might have given me a reason to depart from their constructions.
Therefore, I adopt the nine "undisputed" claim constructions as my own constructions of those terms.
The parties do dispute the constructions of three patent claim terms. The Iowa Defendants assert that, where the parties dispute the scope of a claim term, the court should construe the term to resolve that dispute, citing 02 Micro Int'l, Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed.Cir.2008). Serverside argues that I can resolve any dispute by concluding that no construction of the claim term in question is required, but I do not need to restate every claim term, citing, inter alia, U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed.Cir. 1997).
I agree with Serverside that 02 Micro International stands only for the propositions that resolution of a dispute about construction is for the court, not the jury, and that the court is required to generate a "construction" of a claim term, and determine what claim scope is appropriate in the context of the patent-in-suit, only when the "ordinary" meaning of the term does not resolve the parties' dispute. See 02 Micro Int'l, 521 F.3d at 1361. In that case, the court also observed, "We ... recognize that district courts are not (and
Serverside suggests that whether or not the jury would understand the claim terms without construction is determinative of whether or not I should construe the claim terms. I disagree. As explained more fully below, the standard for claim construction is how claim terms would be understood by "persons skilled in the art in question at the time of the invention." Accent Packaging, Inc. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 707 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2013). Nevertheless, "[t]he terms, as construed by the court, must `ensure that the jury fully understands the court's claim construction rulings and what the patentee covered by the claims.'" Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2010) (quoting Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2004)).
"It is the claims that define the metes and bounds of the patentee's invention." Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, L.L.C., 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2012) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (en banc)). Patent claims may be "independent" or "dependent." See 35 U.S.C. § 112(c).
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that, "[i]n [patent] infringement cases, the court first interprets the claims to determine their scope and meaning." Presidio Components, Inc. v. American Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2012) (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc)). "Next, the jury compares the properly construed claims to the allegedly infringing device." Id. In this two-step process, claim construction is for the court to determine, as a matter of law, and review of its constructions is de novo. Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1456.
"Claim terms are construed in accordance with their usage in the patent specification, and as elaborated in the prosecution history." Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, Inc., 699 F.3d 1305, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2012) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314). As the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals very recently explained,
Accent Packaging, Inc. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 707 F.3d 1318, 1325-26 (Fed.Cir. 2013).
More specifically, "`[t]he person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which [it] appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.'" Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, L.L.C., 703 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2012) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313). "While claim terms are understood in light of the specification, a claim construction must not import limitations from the specification into the claims." Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323). To put it another way, "although the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, [the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has] repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323; Accent Packaging, 707 F.3d at 1326-27 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323). On the other hand, "[b]ecause the patentee is required to define precisely what his invention is ..., it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312; see also Soverain Software L.L.C. v. Newegg, Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1340-41 (Fed.Cir.2013) (quoting this statement from Phillips).
The doctrine of "claim differentiation" also informs the construction of claim terms. This doctrine stems from "`the common sense notion that different words or phrases used in separate claims are presumed to indicate that the claims have different meanings and scope.'" Seachange Int'l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1368-1369 (Fed.Cir.2005) (quoting Karlin Tech. Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971-72 (Fed.Cir. 1999)). As to the relationship between independent and dependent claims, for purposes of claim term construction, "[a]n independent claim impliedly embraces more subject matter than its narrower dependent claim." Intamin Ltd. v. Magnetar Techs., Corp., 483 F.3d 1328, 1335 (Fed.Cir.2007). Indeed, "[i]t is axiomatic that a dependent claim cannot be broader than the claim from which it depends." Alcon Research, Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., 687 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed.Cir.2012). Thus, "[t]he presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not in the independent claim." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. Furthermore, "[w]here... the sole difference between the independent claim and the dependent claims is the limitation that one party is trying to read into the independent claim, `the doctrine of claim differentiation is at its strongest.'" SanDisk Corp. v. Kingston Tech. Co., Inc., 695 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir.2012) (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed.Cir. 2004)). The converse is also true: "Where a particular construction of an independent claim would nullify claims that depend from it, the doctrine of claim differentiation creates a presumption that such a construction is improper." Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2012). Similarly, there is a presumption that two independent claims have different scope when different words or phrases are used in those claims. See Kraft Foods, Inc. v. International Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1365-69 (Fed. Cir.2000). Nevertheless, the presumptions arising from the doctrine of claim differentiation can be overcome by the written description and the prosecution history. Id. at 1368.
As noted above, "[b]ecause the patentee is required to define precisely what his invention is ..., it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. As this statement suggests, claim term construction and the "definiteness" requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (formerly § 112, ¶ 2) are related. See, e.g., Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit, Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2012) (identifying § 112(b) as the source of the "definiteness" requirement). Section 112(b) requires that "[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor
Prosecution history is also relevant to the meaning of patent claim terms. Edwards Lifesciences AG, 699 F.3d at 1312 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314). Thus, "prosecution history estoppel" or "prosecution disclaimer" bars a patentee from recapturing patent scope that was lost by making a narrowing amendment to secure the patent. See Energy Transp. Group, Inc. v. William Demant Holding A/S, 697 F.3d 1342, 1359 (Fed.Cir.2012). "When a patentee makes a `clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution,' a claim's scope may be narrowed under the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer." Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed.Cir. 2012) (citing Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 1374-75 (Fed.Cir.2008)). "`An ambiguous disclaimer, however, does not advance the patent's notice function or justify public reliance, and the court will not use it to limit a claim term's ordinary meaning.'" 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. LogMeIn, Inc., 687 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed.Cir.2012) (quoting SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1287 (Fed.Cir. 2005)); see also Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Electronics Corp., 508 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2007) (explaining that, as a general rule, prosecution history cannot overcome the natural reading of the claim when the alleged disavowal of a particular meaning in the prosecution history is ambiguous). Furthermore, "`[t]here is no "clear and unmistakable" disclaimer if a prosecution argument is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, one of which is consistent with a proffered meaning of the disputed term.'" Id. (again quoting SanDisk, 415 F.3d at 1287). On the other hand, the patentee must overcome a presumption that a narrowing amendment was made to secure the patent, and the patentee can only do so by making a "strong showing" that there is some other explanation for the limitation. Energy Transp. Group, 697 F.3d at 1359.
"[D]efinitions based on dictionaries, treatises, industry practice, and the like often are important aids in interpreting claims." ArcelorMittal France, 700 F.3d at 1320. However, like prosecution
Ultimately, "[t]he construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be [] the correct construction." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.
With these principles in mind, I turn to construction of the disputed claim terms.
The first disputed claim term is "customer identifier that corresponds to the remote customer that personalized said image." The claim term, the claims in which it appears, and the parties' contrasting constructions are set out in the following chart.
Iowa Serverside's Defendants' Claim Relevant Proposed Proposed No. Term/Phrase Claim(s) Construction Construction 1 "customer identifier '199: 1-4, No construction required. "a unique code, but that corresponds to the 6-8, 10-13, not a randomly generated remote customer that 15, 17-18, alphanumeric personalized said 20-21, 24-28 code, generated by image" performing a transformation on a customer's financial account information, such as the customer's name or account number, but not generated using information provided by the customer" "customer identifier '490: 1-4, If construed, then: corresponding to the 6-8, 10-13, "information used to remote customer"/"customer 15, 17-18, identify the remote identifier 20-21, 24-28, customer or user" that corresponds to 30-31 the remote customer" "unique identifier corresponding to the remote user"
In its opening brief, Serverside argued, first, that this term needs no construction, because it will be easily understood by a lay jury — a contention that I rejected above. If I decide that some construction is required, however, Serverside argued that its construction of the term as "information used to identify the remote customer or user" effectively captures the broad definition of the term as used in the specification, which discloses several representative embodiments. Serverside argued that the Iowa Defendants' proposed construction is unduly complex and improperly imports terms found nowhere in the specification in relation to a customer identifier. Serverside also argued that the Iowa Defendants' construction impermissibly seeks to narrow the term by including
In contrast, in their opening brief, the Iowa Defendants postulated that, in light of the specification and the prosecution history, the "customer identifier" term must meet the following requirements: (1) it must be "unique," (2) it must not be a randomly generated alphanumeric code, (3) it cannot be generated using information provided by the customer, and (4) it must be created by performing a transformation on a customer's financial account information. The Iowa Defendants argued that any proper construction must incorporate Serverside's express limitations and disclaimers and that their proposed construction does just that.
In its rebuttal brief, Serverside disputed each of the purported limitations on this term asserted by the Iowa Defendants. Serverside argued that, although the patent discloses many examples of a "customer identifier," nothing in the claim language, the specification, or the prosecution history limits it solely to those examples. Serverside also argued that the Iowa Defendants have focused on short excerpts from prosecution history, taken out of context, instead of remaining centered on the language of the claims themselves.
In their rebuttal brief, the Iowa Defendants reiterated that this term has the four requirements that they have identified. They argued that Serverside contended in the prosecution of the '490 patent that the limitation of the customer identifier encompassing encrypted customer information in combination with the claim as a whole is not disclosed by prior art. They also argued that Serverside's proposed construction simply rearranges the words of the term, but provides no additional clarity to the jury. In short, the Iowa Defendants reiterated that Serverside is ignoring clear and repeated disclaimers in the prosecution history of the patents.
It is simplest to begin my construction of the claim term "customer identifier that corresponds to the remote customer that personalized said image" by rejecting as untenable all of the limitations that the Iowa Defendants seek to impose on the scope and construction of this claim term. The failings of the Iowa Defendants' limitations are manifold.
The Iowa Defendants rely on the following statement in the Detailed Description as demonstrating that the "customer identifier" must be "unique":
'199 Patent, Detailed Description, 10:65-11:8 (emphasis added by the Iowa Defendants). As Serverside points out, however, the Iowa Defendants overlook the beginning of the pertinent passage, which states that this "first step" is "[i]n the
What makes the Iowa Defendants' assertion of a "uniqueness" limitation still less tenable is that the specification discloses another embodiment that expressly "allows a card issuer to avoid the need to create for each customer a unique identifier that must be passed through the card issuer's system." See '199 Patent, Detailed Description, 16:5-8 (explaining the embodiment of Figure
The only reference to the "customer identifier" being "unique" in the claims of the '199 patent is in claim
In short, I tentatively concluded that there is no "uniqueness" requirement or limitation on this claim term.
The Iowa Defendants next assert that the "customer identifier" must exclude "a randomly generated alphanumeric code." This assertion purports to rely on prosecution history, which I agree does inform the construction of claim terms. See Edwards Lifesciences AG, 699 F.3d at 1312. However, the Iowa Defendants' assertion of such an exclusion or disclaimer, based on prosecution history, is untenable.
The Iowa Defendants assert that this quotation from the '199 patent prosecution history demonstrates that Serverside disclaimed "a random alphanumeric identifier" to achieve patentability over the Tuchler prior art:
Defendants' Exhibit 5 (Remarks, Attorney Docket No. 066371-0071, to Application No. 12/132,516), 13-14. However, as Serverside argues, Tuchler disclosed a method and system for producing a personalized gift card or "bearer card," where a "bearer card ... [is] not related to a financial account of a customer," but to a card account for the recipient. Id. at 10. Moreover, the "personalized data" in question did not identify the "customer," but the information applied to the gift card, such as a greeting, and the card account, not the customer's account. Id. at 12. This purported "disclaimer" does not even create an ambiguity about narrowing the patents-in-suit to exclude "a random alphanumeric code" as a "customer identifier," see Elbex Video, 508 F.3d at 1371, nor does it generate a presumption that a narrowing amendment was made to secure the patents. See Energy Transp. Group, 697 F.3d at 1359. The cited portions of the prosecution history simply demonstrate that Serverside successfully argued that Tuchler did not teach or suggest the way that the "customer identifier" was comprised in the patents-in-suit. Id. (any presumption that a narrowing amendment was made to obtain patentability can be overcome by a "strong showing" that there is another explanation for the purported limitation). Indeed, there is nothing resembling a "clear and unmistakable" disclaimer of a "random alphanumeric code" as a "customer identifier" within the meaning of the patents-in-suit. Grober, 686 F.3d at 1341; 01 Communique Lab., 687 F.3d at 1297.
Thus, I tentatively concluded that this purported limitation also is not part of the proper construction of this disputed claim term.
The Iowa Defendants' third purported limitation on the "customer identifier" — that it cannot be generated using information provided by the customer — is also untenable. The Iowa Defendants again assert that there is support for this limitation in purported disclaimers in the prosecution history. None of the purported disclaimers bear scrutiny, however, as none leads to the conclusion that a "customer identifier" cannot be a login name, an e-mail or physical address, a password, or other customer-supplied information, as the Iowa Defendants contend.
First, the Iowa Defendants point to prosecution history stating that neither text nor images entered by the customer can be regarded as financial information
I tentatively rejected this purported limitation of the disputed claim term.
The last limitation that the Iowa Defendants attempt to impose on the "customer identifier" claim term is that it must be created by performing a transformation on a customer's financial account information. This assertion fares even worse than the Iowa Defendants' other arguments concerning construction of this claim term, because the Iowa Defendants completely fail to identify any basis in the claims, the specification, or the prosecution history for this purported limitation on this disputed claim term.
As Serverside points out, the term "transformation" is not used in the specification to describe the generation of a "customer identifier," but to describe the manipulation of an image to be printed on a consumer item. See '199 Patent, 9:33-35 ("As a result, the back end software can make image transformations that exactly mirror those which are seen on the client machine." (emphasis added)); 9:54-59 ("The preferred embodiment thus allows for on-line image manipulation by emulating the browser-based transformations (such as re-sizing or overlaying images), made by the user on a representation of the image, on the server so that the images produced can be used for personalized product creation." (emphasis added)); 12:56-60 ("Upon receiving the images in step
Finally, even assuming that "encryption" of customer account information is a "transformation" of a customer's account information, embodiments in which the "customer identifier" comprises "encrypted customer information by a card issuer encrypting financial account information of a remote customer," see '199 Patent, 7:9-11, demonstrate that this is not the only form that the "customer identifier" can take. See Kraft Foods, 203 F.3d at 1365-69 (explaining that there is a presumption two independent claims have different scope when different words or phrases are used in those claims). Again assuming that this is what the Iowa Defendants mean by "a transformation" of a customer's financial account information, it is also improper to confine claims to a particular embodiment. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
I tentatively concluded that this purported limitation on the disputed claim term was wholly without merit.
While it was easy enough to demonstrate that the Iowa Defendants' construction is untenable, that does not mean that Serverside's construction of the "customer identifier" term as "information used to identify the remote customer or user" is necessarily appropriate. Serverside is correct that the patent discloses numerous representative embodiments of the "customer identifier," so that the term is used broadly and is not limited by the examples disclosed. This does little, however, to help define the proper construction — if any is required. The specific fault that I find with Serverside's construction is that Serverside apparently equates "customer identifier that corresponds" with "information used to identify," but cites no portion of the claims, the specification, or the prosecution history that supports the apparent correlation of "identifier" with "information" and "corresponds" with "used to identify."
What, then, is the proper construction of "customer identifier that corresponds to the remote customer that personalized said image"? Beginning with the "ordinary meaning" of the phrase, in the absence of any showing that the "ordinary meaning" differs from the "ordinary meaning as understood by persons skilled in the art in question," see Accent Packaging, 707 F.3d at 1325, it appears to me that this phrase has three components: (1) "a customer identifier"; (2) "that corresponds to" or "corresponding to"; and (3) "the remote customer." I believe that consideration of each of these three components will lead to the proper construction of the phrase.
As to the first component, "customer identifier," I am reluctant, as a matter of ordinary meaning, to equate "information" with "identifier," or even to equate "information used to identify the remote customer" with "customer identifier," as Serverside suggests. Turning to a standard dictionary, see ArcelorMittal France, 700 F.3d at 1320 (recognizing the recourse to a dictionary may be appropriate), an "identifier" is simply "one that identifies," and "identify" has the ordinary meaning "to
In the context of the claims and specification, it appears to me that the second component, "corresponds" or "corresponding," has the ordinary meaning of "match" or "matching." See, e.g., MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 260 (definition (1)(b) of "correspond"). Indeed, the entire claim term, and its use in the claims and specification, requires that the "customer identifier" matches with "the remote customer that personalized said image." See, e.g., '199 Patent, claim
The last component, "the remote customer," or more completely, "the remote customer that personalized the image," is the easiest of the three components of this claim term to construe, because the Delaware court has already done so. As noted above, at page 19, the second claim term construed by the Delaware court was "financial record of the remote customer that personalized the image." The Delaware court construed the italicized component only by dropping "remote," so that its construction is "record of financial information of the customer that personalized the image." I believe that, "in the interest of uniformity and correctness," I should consult the Delaware court's construction of the identical part of a claim term in the same patent. Cf. Finisar Corp., 523 F.3d at 1329. Finding no conflict between this construction of "the remote customer that personalized the image" and the claims, specification, or prosecution history, and noting the parties' agreement to it, see WMS Gaming Inc., 184 F.3d at 1347 n. 2,
Consequently, I tentatively concluded that the construction of "customer identifier that corresponds to the remote customer that personalized said image" that "stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention," and consequently, is "the correct construction," Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (stating this as the ultimate standard for claim construction), is "a signal, character, or group of characters that matches with the customer that personalized the image." I also believe that this construction will "`ensure that the jury fully understands [my] claim construction rulings and what the patentee covered by the claims.'" Power-One, 599 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Sulzer Textil A.G., 358 F.3d at 1366).
I display that tentative construction below with the claim term and the parties' differing proposals:
Iowa Claim Serverside's Defendants' Court's Term/ Proposed Proposed Tentative No. Phrase Construction Construction Construction 1 "customer identifier that corresponds No construction "a unique code, but not a "a signal, character, or group to the remote customer required. randomly generated alphanumeric of characters that matches that personalized said code, generated by with the customer that personalized image" performing a transformation the image" on a customer's financial account information, such as the customer's name or account number, but not generated using information provided by the customer" "customer identifier corresponding If construed, to the remote customer"/"customer then: "information identifier used to that corresponds to the remote identify the remote customer" customer or user" "unique identifier corresponding to the remote user"
At the outset of this Markman decision, I poked fun at both Severside's and the Iowa Defendants' constructions of the second "disputed" claim term, "secure unique identifier." Doing so was not without good reason, as the summary of the parties' arguments for their respective constructions and my analysis below will show.
The second disputed claim term and the parties' contrasting constructions are, as follows:
Iowa Claim Serverside's Defendants' Term/ Relevant Proposed Proposed No. Phrase Claim(s) Construction Construction 2 "secure unique identifer" '199: 1 No construction required. Indefinite. quired. If construed, then: In the alternative, if "unique identifier not indefinite: "encrypted which is secure" customer information"
In its opening brief, Serverside argued that this claim term does not require construction, because it is readily understandable to a lay jury. If I determine that some construction is appropriate, Serverside argued that I should construe the term as "unique identifier which is secure," because that construction best captures the ordinary meaning of the term, while the Iowa Defendants' proposed construction improperly imports a limitation from a single claim and the specification, instead of encompassing the broader meaning plainly intended in the claims and specification.
In their opening brief, the Iowa Defendants asserted that this claim term cannot be a "one-way code," because it is the other option for the "customer identifier" claimed in claim
In its rebuttal brief, Serverside argued that the Iowa Defendants improperly narrow this disputed claim term. Serverside pointed out that, while the specification does state, in one embodiment, that the "customer identifier" comprises one of a one-way code, a unique customer identifier, and encrypted customer information, it would be improper to limit the disputed term to these three options. Serverside argued that only the strained "logic games" employed by the Iowa Defendants lead to the erroneous conclusion that "secure unique identifier" must be another way of identifying "encrypted customer information." Serverside argued that the Iowa Defendants' construction is not supported by the specification. Furthermore, Serverside argued that the Iowa Defendants' "indefiniteness" argument is supported only by the same strained "logic games," but the Iowa Defendants have not overcome the presumption of validity of the patent.
In their rebuttal brief, the Iowa Defendants again relied on their misstatement of Serverside's construction as "unique identifier generated securely." They argued that the patent does not say that there are several ways to generate a unique identifier securely. They then reiterated their argument that "logic games" lead to the conclusion that "secure unique identifier" must mean "encrypted customer information," and/or that this claim term is indefinite.
I think it is sufficient to reject Serverside's construction of "secure unique identifier" as "unique identifier which is secure" on the ground that it is a "Sheldonian construction," similar to explaining "heart-attack-like event" as "an event that's like a heart attack." See, supra, p. 629. Thus, this proposed construction clears up nothing, or, to put it in the language of patent law, it utterly fails to "resol[ve] disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and ... explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement.'" 02 Micro Int'l, 521 F.3d at 1362 (quoting U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568).
I also reject the Iowa Defendants' construction of "secure unique identifier" as "encrypted customer information" on the ground that it is premised not just on "logic games," but on logical fallacies. First, although the Iowa Defendants are correct that the specification does explain that "the customer identifier may comprise one of: a one-way code, a unique customer identifier, and encrypted customer information," see '199 Patent, 7:4-6, this explanation is prefaced by the statement, "In further related embodiments...." Id. at 7:4. Thus, the Iowa Defendants again commit the classic error of importing limitations from the specification into the claims. See Deere & Co., 703 F.3d at 1353-54 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 ("[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, [the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has] repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments."); accord Accent Packaging, 707 F.3d at 1326-27 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323). Furthermore, the specification of this particular embodiment plainly distinguishes "unique customer identifier" from "encrypted customer information," so that, even supposing these were the only options that could comprise a "secure unique identifier," there must be some "secure unique identifiers" that are not "encrypted customer information." Similarly, while the specification does describe "encrypted customer information" as "generated within a secure environment," see '199 Patent, Summary, 6:48-49, the description of this single embodiment plainly does not mean that all "secure unique identifiers" must be "encrypted customer information generated within a secure environment." Deere & Co., 703 F.3d at 1353-54.
Worse still, the Iowa Defendants' construction violates the doctrine of claim differentiation, which stems from "`the common sense notion that different words or phrases used in separate claims are presumed to indicate that the claims have different meanings and scope.'" Seachange Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d at 1368-1369. The claims of the '490 patent expressly claim customer identifiers limited to "encrypted customer information," differentiating those patent claims from the related claims of the '199 patent, which stem from the same original application, but claim "customer identifiers that are either "secure unique identifiers" or "a one-way-code." See Kraft Foods, 203 F.3d at 1365-69 (explaining that there is a presumption that two independent claims have different scope when different words or phrases are used in those claims). Thus, the "secure unique identifier" limitation claimed in the
Finally, the Iowa Defendants make the fallacious argument that "secure" is somehow superfluous if the term "secure unique identifier" means "unique customer identifier." This argument is premised on the assertion that a "customer identifier" must be both "unique" and "secure." I demonstrated above, however, that the "customer identifier" does not have to be "unique," in my construction of that disputed term. The portion of the specification to which the Iowa Defendants cite as support for the "secure" limitation in their construction does not support that contention, either. It states, "The method comprises: associating financial data, corresponding to the financial account of the customer, with a customer identifier in a financial account association table maintained securely from a user interface." '199 Patent, 4:60-63. The Iowa Defendants' argument fails, because the Iowa Defendants are once again attempting to import a limitation from the description of one of many embodiments, prefaced in this instance with the language, "In another embodiment according to the invention ....," id. at 4:57, into the construction of the claim term. See Deere & Co., 703 F.3d at 1353-54 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 ("[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, [the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has] repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments."). It also fails, because the reference to "security" here is not to the "generation" of the "customer identifier," or even to the "customer identifier" itself being "secure," but to "a financial account association table maintained securely from a user interface." '199 Patent, 4:60-63. Thus, because "uniqueness" is not a limitation of the "customer identifier," and only some of the embodiments described in the specification describe "security" as an element or limitation, nothing makes "secure" superfluous if "secure unique identifier" means "unique customer identifier."
Nor does the Iowa Defendants' "indefiniteness" argument hold water. Although the "definiteness" requirement "is drawn from the court's performance of its duty as the construer of the patent claims," Atmel Corp., 198 F.3d at 1378, that requirement "does not compel absolute clarity" in claim language. Datamize, 477 F.3d at 1347. It is only the Iowa Defendants' fallacious "logic games" that suggest that this claim term is "not amenable to construction" or "insolubly ambiguous." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Beginning with the "ordinary meaning" of the phrase, in the absence of any showing that the "ordinary meaning" differs from the "ordinary meaning as understood by persons skilled in the art in question," see Accent Packaging, 707 F.3d at 1325, it is clear from claim
I do not believe that any doubt about the meaning and scope of this claim term actually relates to either the "secure" or the "unique" component. See 02 Micro Int'l, 521 F.3d at 1362 (explaining the purpose of construction is to "resol[ve] disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and ... explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement.'" (quoting U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568)). I think that these words were intended to have their ordinary meaning; indeed, the parties have pointed to nothing in the description or the claims of the patents-in-suit that convincingly demonstrates otherwise. I also believe that leaving these words undefined in any construction of the claim terms will not prevent their meaning from being clear to a jury's full understanding of what the patentee covered with the claims. Power-One, Inc., 599 F.3d at 1348 ("The terms, as construed by the court, must `ensure that the jury fully understands the court's claim construction rulings and what the patentee covered by the claims.'" (quoting Sulzer Textil A.G., 358 F.3d at 1366)). The point of confusion, in my view, is the meaning of "identifier."
I explained above why I believe that "customer identifier," within the meaning of the first disputed claim term, means "a signal, character, or group of characters that can be used to identify the customer." I find that, because the "secure unique identifier" is a specific kind of "customer identifier," it is appropriate to define it as "a secure, unique signal, character, or group of characters that can be used to identify the customer." I believe that this construction "stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention," and consequently, is "the correct construction." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (stating this as the ultimate standard for claim construction). I also believe that this construction will "`ensure that the jury fully understands [my] claim construction rulings and what the patentee covered by the claims.'" Power-One, 599 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Sulzer Textil A.G., 358 F.3d at 1366).
My tentative construction is shown below with the claim term and the parties' differing proposals:
Iowa Claim Serverside's Defendants' Term/ Proposed Proposed Court's No. Phrase Construction Construction Construction 2 "secure unique identifier" No construction Indefinite. "a secure, unique signal, required. character, or group of characters that can be used to identify the customer" If construed, In the alternative, if not then: "unique indefinite: "encrypted identifier customer information" which is secure"
The last disputed claim term is "encrypted customer information" or "encrypted remote user information." This claim term and the parties' contrasting constructions are displayed below:
Iowa Claim Serverside's Defendants' Term/ Relevant Proposed Proposed No. Phrase Claim(s) Construction Construction 3 "encrypted customer '490: 1,29-31 No construction "a unique code, but not infonnation"/"encrypted required. a randomly generated remote user alphanumeric code, information" generated within a secure environment by performing a transformation on a customer's financial account information" If construed, then: "customer or remote user information which has been encrypted or encoded"
In its opening brief, Serverside asserted that this claim term, like the other two disputed claim terms, actually needs no construction, because it will be easily understood by a lay jury. In the alternative, if some construction is required, Serverside argued that its proposed construction should be adopted, because it captures the ordinary meaning of the phrase without impermissibly narrowing it. Serverside argued that, in internet security, the ordinary meaning of "encryption" is "the coding of a clear text message by a transmitting unit so as to prevent unauthorized eavesdropping along the transmission line; the receiving unit uses the same algorithm as the transmitting unit to decode the incoming message." Serverside also argued that the patent does not specify which information is encrypted beyond "customer information" or "remote user information," so that the scope of this claim term should not be further limited. Serverside argued that the Iowa Defendants have, once again, improperly imported limitations from specific embodiments in the specification into their construction of this claim term. Serverside also pointed out that the specification only refers to "transformation" in reference to images, not to account information. Serverside also argued that the prosecution history does not support exclusion of a randomly generated alphanumeric code.
In their opening brief, however, the Iowa Defendants asserted that, as to both "customer identifier" in the '199 patent and "encrypted customer information" in the '490 patent, Serverside disclaimed "a randomly generated alphanumeric code." The Iowa Defendants also argued that the specification repeatedly describes the "encrypted customer information" as generated from the customer's financial account information. The Iowa Defendants also argued that the specification shows that the encrypted customer information is generated in a secure environment. Finally, the Iowa Defendants reiterated their argument that the "encrypted customer
In its rebuttal brief, Serverside argued that the Iowa Defendants' proposed construction of this disputed claim term suffers from the same deficiencies as their proposed constructions of the other disputed claim terms. More specifically, Serverside argued that the Iowa Defendants have misread the patents when they assert that the only difference between them is that the '199 patent refers to a "customer identifier," while the '490 patent refers to "encrypted customer information," because the claims of both patents refer to a "customer identifier," and the specification of both patents refers to "encrypted customer information" as a "customer identifier." Thus, Serverside argued, in both patents, "encryption" is just one way to create a "customer identifier." Serverside reiterated that there is no support for the Iowa Defendants' "transformation of customer financial account information" limitation; rather, Serverside argued that the described embodiments expand the scope of the "account information" beyond just "financial account information." Indeed, Serverside pointed out that dependent claim
In their rebuttal brief, the Iowa Defendants reiterated that the fundamental difference between the two patents is that the '199 patent refers to a "customer identifier," while the '490 patent refers to "encrypted customer [or remote user] information." The Iowa Defendants then reiterated their arguments about the kind of information that is "encrypted."
Again, Serverside's construction of "encrypted customer information" as "customer [or remote user] information which has been encrypted or encoded" must be rejected as a "Sheldonian construction," similar to explaining "heart-attack-like event" as "an event that's like a heart attack." See, supra, p. 629. Thus, this proposed construction clears up nothing, or, to put it in the language of patent law, it utterly fails to "resol[ve] disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and ... explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement.'" 02 Micro Int'l, 521 F.3d at 1362 (quoting U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568). The only new component of Serverside's construction is "or encoded," but this addition does nothing to clarify what "customer information" is involved, even if it clarifies "encrypted."
I have also rejected each component of the Iowa Defendants' proposed construction of this disputed claim term in my rejection of the Iowa Defendants' proposed constructions of other disputed terms. Somewhat more specifically, claim
Beginning with the "ordinary meaning" of the disputed phrase, see Accent Packaging, 707 F.3d at 1325-26, it is readily apparent that there are two components to construe: "encrypted" and "customer information." More specifically, the questions are, what form does "encryption" take, and what "customer information" is "encrypted"?
The Summary and Detailed Description explain that, in some embodiments, the "encrypted customer information" is "generated within a secure environment." See '199 Patent, Summary, 6:48-49. Of course, this does not mean that, in all embodiments, the "encrypted customer information" must be "generated within a secure environment." See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 ("[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, [the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has] repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.").
In addition, however, the Summary states that, in at least one embodiment, the "encrypted customer information" is "decrypted" using "an encryption key." See '199 Patent, Summary, 6:55-58. Similarly, the Detailed Description describes one example of creating a secure user identifier by encrypting user information, as follows:
'199 Patent, Detailed Description, 17:13-22. These portions of the specification are consistent with Serverside's observation that, in internet security, the ordinary meaning of "encryption" is "the coding of a clear text message by a transmitting unit so as to prevent unauthorized eavesdropping along the transmission line; the receiving unit uses the same algorithm as the transmitting unit to decode the incoming message." Serverside's Opening Brief at 15 (quoting MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS 717 (6th ed.2003), which is attached to the Opening Brief as Exhibit D). I note that the same learned dictionary defines "encrypt" by reference to "encipher," and defines "encipher" as "[t]o convert a plain-text message into unintelligible language by means of a cryptosystem." See MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS at 717. To avoid any concern that "plain-text" or "clear text" is a term of art, I believe that it is appropriate to substitute "original text."
Thus, I tentatively concluded that an appropriate construction of "encrypted" here is "coded from original text into language that is unintelligible to unauthorized persons."
Turning to the second component of this disputed claim term, "customer information," the specification states, as to one embodiment, "[t]he encrypted customer information may be encrypted by a card issuer encrypting financial account information of the remote customer." '199 Patent, Summary, 7:9-12 (emphasis added). However, it would be improper to adopt this description of a single embodiment as the sole meaning of the phrase. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 ("[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, [the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has] repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments."); see also Deere & Co., 703 F.3d at 1354 (cautioning that "a claim construction must not import limitations from the specification into the claims"). Moreover, as Serverside points out, dependent claim
The specification includes numerous instances where it has used "customer [or user] information," "customer [or user] account information," or even "encrypted customer information" without further definition or limitation of the "information" involved. See, e.g., '199 Patent, 5:65-6:8, 6:12-13, 6:20-23; 6:47-59. Thus, I tentatively concluded that "customer information" was intended to have a broad meaning, encompassing any information related to the customer, including, but not limited to, financial account information.
Consideration of the components of this disputed claim term "encrypted customer [or remote user] information" led me to the tentative conclusion that the construction that "stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention," and consequently, is "the correct construction," Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (stating this as the ultimate standard for claim construction), is "customer information coded from original text into language that is unintelligible to unauthorized persons." I also believe that this construction will "`ensure that the jury fully understands [my] claim construction rulings and what the patentee covered by the claims.'" Power-One, 599 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Sulzer Textil A.G., 358 F.3d at 1366).
I display my construction below with the disputed claim term and the parties' differing proposals:
Iowa Claim Serverside's Defendants' Court's Term/ Proposed Proposed Tentative No. Phrase Construction Construction Construction 3 "encrypted customer information"/ No construction "a unique code, but not a "customer information "encrypted remote required. randomly generated alphanumeric coded from original text user infomation" code, generated into language that is unintelligible within a secure environment to unauthorized by performing a persons" transformation on a customer's financial account information"
If construed, then: "customer or remote user information which has been encrypted or encoded"
Prior to the Markman hearing, I tentatively construed the "undisputed" and "disputed" claim terms at issue in this patent infringement action as shown in the following chart:
UNDISPUTED CLAIM TERMS No. Claim Term/ Relevant Agreed Phrase Claim(s) Construction 1 "financial transaction card" '199: 1, 2, 9, "a transaction card (e.g., credit card, 14-16, 18, debit card, ATM card, or similar card), 22, 25, 29 but not a prepaid bearer '490: 1, 2, 9, card" 14-16, 18, 22, 25, 29-31 2 "financial record of the remote customer '199: 1 '490: "record of financial information of that personalized the image" 1 the customer that personalized the image" 3 "one-way code" '199: 1 "a hash value created from customer information" 4 "image processing means for '490: 30-31 Means plus function term, with the providing an image, produced function being "providing an image, based on said instructions for based on instructions for manipulation, manipulation, for application to for application to the financial the financial transaction card" transaction card," and the associated structure being "an image processor (see, e.g., back end software 110 and image manipulation emulator 256)" 5 "means for embedding the '199: 25 Means plus function term, with the customer identifier in the '490: 25 function being "embedding the customer personalized image" identifier in the personalized image" and the associated structure being "a back end server (such as server 1103 or 1203) that embeds the customer identifier in the personalized image, for example by embedding the identifier in a bar code, machine readable code, or metadata" 6 "computer program means for '199: 30 The three phrases are means plus presenting to a remote customer '490: 30-31 function claim terms, with the function the remote user interface" being "presenting to a remote customer or remote user a user interface" and the associated structure being "a user interface (see,
e.g., front end software 105 and Figs. 3-10)" "computer program means for presenting to a remote customer a user interface" "computer program means for presenting to a remote user an user interface" 7 "image instruction means for receiving '199: 30 The phrase is a means plus function instructions for manipulation '490: 30-31 claim term, with the function being of an image file...." "receiving instructions for manipulation of an image file" and the associated structure being "an image compilation server coupled to a communications link (see, e.g., image compilation server 108)" (The language following this phrase differs somewhat in the 3 claims where it appears.) 8 "an identifier selected from a secure '199: 1 "a customer identifier that is chosen unique identifier and a one-way from one of two available code" options: a secure unique identifier or a one-way code" 9 "instructions defining said plurality '199: 29 "instructions for implementing all of manipulations applied to the '490: 29 of the manipulations that a remote graphical representation" user applies to a graphical representation on a remote terminal"
DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS Iowa Claim Serverside's Defendants' Court's Term/ Relevant Proposed Proposed Tentative No. /Phrase Claim(s) Construction Construction Construction 1 "customer identifier '199: 1-4, No construction A unique code, but "a signal character, that corresponds to 6-8, 10-13, required. not a randomly or group of characters the remote customer 15, 17-18 generated alphanumeric that matches that personalized 20-21. 24-28 code, generated with the customer said image" by performing that personalized a transformation on the image" a customer's financial account information, such as the customer's name or account number, but not generated using information provided by the customer. "customer identifier '490: 1-4 If construed, then: corresponding 6-8, 10-13, information used to the remote customer"/ 15, 17-18, to identify the remote "customer 20-21, 24-28 customer of identifier that corresponds 30-31 user." to the remote customer" 2 "secure unique '199: 1 No construction required. Indefinite. "a secure, unique identifier" signal, character, or group of characters that can be used to
identify the customer" If construed, then: In the alternative, "unique identifier if not indefinite: which is secure" "encrypted customer information." 3 "encrypted customer '490: 1, No construction required. "a unique code, but "customer information information"/ 29-31 not a randomly coded from "encrypted generated alphanumeric original text into remote user information" code, generated language than is unintelligible within a secure to unauthorized by performing a persons" transformation on a customer's financial account information" If construed, then: "customer or remote user information which has been encrypted or encoded"
At the Markman hearing on February 20, 2013, the Iowa Defendants offered, without objection from Serverside, and I admitted, four additional exhibits: Defendants' Exhibit 8, which is a copy of the Tuchler prior art patent (U.S. Patent No. 2004/0099730 A1); Exhibit 9, which is a copy of Severside's Joint Claim Construction Brief in the Delaware action; Exhibit 10, which is a copy of the June 3, 2008, Office Action from the PTO on Application No. 12/132,516; and Exhibit 11, which is a copy of the November 24, 2010, Office Action from the PTO on Application No. 12/954,277. Serverside did not offer any additional exhibits or other evidence. At my request, the parties provided me with copies of the demonstrative slides that they had used in their arguments.
Serverside's position at the Markman hearing was, in essence, that my tentative constructions were correct — indeed, Serverside conceded that they may even be improvements upon Serverside's proposed constructions — and that everything in the tentative draft opinion was correct. The Iowa Defendants' position was, in essence, that my tentative constructions were correct, so far as they went. To make my tentative constructions of the first and third disputed claim terms more accurate, however, the Iowa Defendants urged me to insert the "unique" and "but not a randomly generated alphanumeric code" limitations that I had previously rejected. The Iowa Defendants supported their reassertion of these tentatively rejected limitations primarily with the new exhibits that they offered at the Markman hearing and citations to additional portions of previously-offered exhibits.
As to the placement of these limitations, the Iowa Defendants suggested at the Markman hearing that "unique" become the first limitation of each of these claim terms and that "but not a randomly generated alphanumeric code" become the last limitation. Thus, as to the first disputed claim term, "customer identifier that corresponds to the remote customer that personalized said image," the Iowa Defendants argued that my tentative construction should be amended to read "a unique signal, character, or group of characters
Setting aside, for the moment, the question of whether or not I should insert these tentatively rejected limitations, I do not believe that the placement of these limitations suggested by the Iowa Defendants would be consistent with the Iowa Defendants' original proposed constructions or with basic grammar. Rather, I believe that, to be consistent with the Iowa Defendants' original proposed constructions and with basic grammar, these limitations must each be placed as close as possible to the terms that the Iowa Defendants argued should be further limited.
Thus, as to the first disputed claim term, basic grammar would suggest that both "unique" and "but not a randomly generated alphanumeric code" should be placed as close as possible to "a signal, character, or group of characters," i.e., the "customer identifier," because "customer identifier" is the term that the Iowa Defendants argued must be further limited. While I do not quibble with the Iowa Defendants' proposed placement of the "unique" limitation, the Iowa Defendants' proposed placement of "but not a randomly generated alphanumeric code" after "the customer that personalized the image," suggests that the "signal, character, or group of characters" must match with "the customer that personalized the image," but not match with "a randomly generated alphanumeric code," which is nonsensical.
Similarly, as to the third disputed claim term, the proposed limitations must be placed as close as possible to the resulting "language that is unintelligible to unauthorized persons," i.e., the "encrypted customer information," because "encrypted customer information" is the term that the Iowa Defendants contended must be further limited. More specifically, what must be "unique" is the resulting "language," not the original "customer information" that is coded from original text into resulting "language," and what must not be "a randomly generated alphanumeric code" is the resulting "language that is unintelligible to unauthorized persons." In contrast, the Iowa Defendants' proposed placement of the "unique" limitation makes the original "customer information," not the resulting "language," what must be "unique." Their proposed placement of the second limitation creates an ambiguity, because it could suggest that the resulting "language" must be "unintelligible" to "unauthorized persons," but not "unintelligible" to "a randomly generated alphanumeric code," which is nonsensical. This ambiguity can be remedied, however, by contracting "language that is unintelligible to unauthorized persons" into "language unintelligible to unauthorized persons," and by inserting "into" into the requested limitation, so that it reads "but not into a randomly generated alphanumeric code."
Thus, I have displayed below, side-by-side, Serverside's original proposed constructions, the Iowa Defendants' original proposed constructions, my tentative constructions, and the Iowa Defendants' proposed revisions to my tentative constructions, with their proposed revisions
DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS Iowa Iowa Defendants' Claim Relevant Serverside's Defendants' Court's Proposed Term/ Proposed Proposed Tentative Revised No. Phrase Claim(s) Construction Construction Construction Construction 1 "customer identifier '199: 1-4, No construction "a unique code, "a signal, character, "a unique signal, that corresponds 6-8, required. but not a randomly or group of character, or to the remote 10-13, 15, generated alphanumeric characters that group of characters, customer 17-18, code, matches with the but not a tliat personalized 20-21, generated by performing customer that personalized randomly generated said image" 24-28 a transformation the image" alphanumericcode, on a that matches customer's financial with the customer account information, that personalized such as the image" the customer's name or account number, but not generated using information provided by the customer" "customer identifier '490: 1-4, If construed, then: corresponding 6-8, "information used to the remote 10-13, 15, to identify the remote customer"/"customer 17-18, customer or identifier 20-21, user" that corresponds 24-28, to the remote customer" 30-31 "unique identifier corresponding to the remote user" 3 "encrypted customer '490: 1, No construction "a unique code, "customer information "customer information information"/"encrypted 29-31 required. but not a randomly coded fi'ora coded from remote user information" generated original text into original text into alphanumeric language that is unique language code, generated unintelligible to unintelligible to within a secure unauthorized persons" unauthorized persons, environment by but not into performing a a randomly generated transformation on alpiianunieric a customer's financial code" account information" If construed, then: "customer or remote user information which has been encrypted or encoded"
Because the Iowa Defendants argue that the same rationale supports inserting the reurged limitations into the two still-disputed claim terms, I will consider these reurged limitations in turn, rather than reconsidering my tentative constructions of the two still-disputed claim terms in turn.
At the Markman hearing, the Iowa Defendants argued that "unique" should be inserted as a limitation in the first and third disputed claim terms, because of repeated references to a "unique" "customer identifier" in the figures and specification
Moreover, the Iowa Defendants contended that Figure
The Iowa Defendants also argued that, even though the embodiment described in Figure
In response, Severside argued that I correctly identified in my tentative ruling two fundamental reasons why there is no "unique" limitation on a "customer identifier" or "encrypted customer information": First, each place that the Iowa Defendants identified a reference to the term "unique" is, ultimately, only an example of an embodiment, it is not a claim limitation, and, second, claim differentiation would preclude injecting such a limitation.
More specifically, Serverside argued that each of the references to the "customer identifier" being "unique" that the Iowa Defendants identified in the specification, either before or at the Markman hearing, is prefaced with language making clear that it describes a specific embodiment. Serverside also argued that there are descriptions of embodiments that do not require a "unique" identifier, such as the one shown in Figure
As to claim differentiation, Serverside argued that, as I noted in my tentative construction, there is an express requirement in claim
I find that most of the Iowa Defendants' arguments reurging the "unique" limitation are unpersuasive for the same two reasons that I rejected the arguments for this limitation in their pre-hearing briefs. First, as Serverside points out, the beginning of every passage of the specification referring to a "unique" identifier that the Iowa Defendants have identified, either before or at the Markman hearing, states that it is limited to the description of a single embodiment. This is certainly true of the description of Figure
Second, the insertion of a "unique" limitation would violate the doctrine of claim differentiation. As I explained in my tentative ruling, the only reference to the "customer identifier" being "unique" in the claims of the '199 patent is in claim
The truly new parts of the Iowa Defendants' arguments at the Markman hearing reurging the "unique" limitation do not give me much greater pause. Those arguments are (1) that a "one-way code" or "hash value," which is purportedly described in the claims and specification as an alternative to a "unique" identifier is, in fact, "unique," and (2) that the distinction between embodiments using a "one-way code" and those using some other "customer identifier" is not whether or not the identifier is "unique," but who or what generates or "creates" it, because, they asserted, the other "customer identifiers" are created by the customer, but the "one-way code" is created computationally, within the system.
Both of these arguments focus on the following description of Figure
'199 Patent, 16:5-39 (emphasis added).
Putting aside that this description is prefaced with language limiting it to a single embodiment, so that it is not properly the stuff of limitations on the scope of the patents-in-suit, see Deere & Co., 703 F.3d at 1353-54 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313); Accent Packaging, 707 F.3d at 1326-27; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323, it is clear that the "one-way code" or "hash value" is never described as "unique" in column 16, contrary to the Iowa Defendants' assertion that there are "repeated" references to the "one-way code" or "hash value" being "unique" in this portion of the specification. Rather, the "hash" is created from "a unique part of the customer record (such as the customer's name)." '199 Patent, 16:22-23.
Furthermore, creation of a "hash" or "hash value" such that it "should be computationally infeasible to find another input string that will generate the same hash value," see id. at 16:27-29, does not mean that the hash value is necessarily "unique," contrary to the Iowa Defendants' contention. Rather, as the Iowa Defendants concede, there is a possibility, however infinitesimally small, that the same "hash value" will be generated from another input string. Thus, this requirement does not mean that it is "impossible" to generate the "same hash" value from a different input string. If I construed "computationally infeasible to find another input string that will generate the same hash value" in the specification to mean that the "hash value" is "unique," I would grossly modify the meaning of "hash value" or "one-way code," much as I concluded, in a prior patent case, that construing claim language claiming a process to manufacture washing machine tubs "eliminating" or "lacking" "knit lines" to mean only "eliminating"
The Iowa Defendants also argued at the Markman hearing that what distinguishes the embodiment in Figure
Furthermore, I have not found a description of any embodiment in which the "unique identifier" is created by the customer, rather than by the "card issuer," but I have found other embodiments that are silent as to who or what part of the process creates the "unique identifier," suggesting that a "unique identifier," like a "one-way code," might be created computationally, within the system. Compare id. at 10:62-66 (explaining that, in the embodiment in Figure
Thus, the specification of the patents does not support the Iowa Defendants' reassertion of a "unique" limitation on the "customer identifier" in the first disputed claim term. See Deere & Co., 703 F.3d at 1354 (stating that "`[t]he person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which [it] appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification,'" (quoting Phillips,
"`The person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which [it] appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.'" Id. Here, reading the "customer identifier" claim term in the context of other claims also does not support the Iowa Defendants' reassertion of a distinction between "one-way code" identifiers and other "customer identifiers" on the basis of who or what generated each kind of code. Dependent claims
'199 Patent, Claims
In short, the Iowa Defendants have pointed to nothing in the claims or the specification of the patents-in-suit that proves, or even generates an inference, that all "customer identifiers," including "one-way codes," must be "unique." Rather, the constructions of the first and third disputed claim terms that "stay[] true to the claim language and most naturally align[ ] with the patent's description of the invention," and consequently, are "the correct construction[s]" of those claim terms, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (stating this as the ultimate standard for claim construction), do not include a "unique" limitation for the "customer identifier."
I will not insert the proposed "unique" limitation into my final constructions of the first and third disputed claim terms.
At the Markman hearing, the Iowa Defendants also reurged insertion of a "not a randomly generated alphanumeric code" limitation into the constructions of the first and third disputed claim terms. Serverside argues that I correctly rejected such a limitation on either disputed claim term in my tentative ruling.
The Tuchler prior art patent and the prosecution history for the patents-in-suit
The Tuchler prior art is U.S. Patent No. 2004/0099730 A1, which issued on May 27, 2004. A copy of that patent was admitted into evidence at the Markman hearing as the Iowa Defendants' Exhibit 8.
The Abstract of the Tuchler patent explains the claimed invention, briefly, as follows:
Tuchler Patent, Abstract. In short, Tuchler disclosed "a method of personalizing gift cards, which includes allowing a customer to upload a customer-specified image onto the internet from a first location, download the customer-specified image (e.g., a digital photograph file) from the internet to a second location (e.g., a customer service department) and apply the image to a gift card." Tuchler Patent, Summary Of The Invention, ¶ [0006].
I find the first three figures from the Tuchler patent to be helpful in understanding the parts of the specification of this patent that figure in the parts of the prosecution history on which the present parties' arguments are based. According to the Brief Description Of The Drawings, Figures
The following paragraphs of the Detailed Description of the Tuchler patent explain the figures included above and are central to the parts of the prosecution history of the patents-in-suit of interest here:
Tuchler Patent, ¶¶
The most critical portions of the Detailed Description of the Tuchler patent in the portions of the prosecution history cited by the parties are the following:
Tuchler Patent, ¶¶
On June 28, 2010, the Examiner filed an Office Action, Iowa Defendants' Exhibit 10 — which was submitted only at the Markman hearing, not with pre-hearing briefing — rejecting all claims of the pending application for the patents-in-suit. That Office Action, inter alia, rejected application claim 1, in part, because "[p]aragraphs 0023-0025 [of Tuchler] disclose a module to receive a customer identifier that corresponds to the remote customer that personalized the image [and] further discuss a controller operable, based on the customer identifier, to cause printing of the personalized customer image onto the card material and to cause application of relevant financial information from the financial record onto the card material." Exhibit 10 at 3 (emphasis added).
That Office Action also stated,
Exhibit 10 at 5-6 (emphasis added).
Serverside's response, Iowa Defendants' Exhibit 5 — which was attached to pre-hearing briefing — was to amend application claims and to assert two main arguments relevant to the limitation currently at issue: (1) that Tuchler does not disclose a "customer identifier," but a "data identifier," and (2) that the "random" identifier in Tuchler could not be a "customer identifier" or "encrypted customer information."
Exhibit 5 at 9 (underlining in the original; italics added).
Serverside's assertion that Tuchler disclosed only a method related to "bearer cards" or "gift cards," rather than all "financial transaction cards," also figured in Serverside's argument that Tuchler discloses only a "data identifier," not a "customer identifier." On this issue, Serverside argued, inter alia, as follows:
Exhibit 5 at 10 (emphasis added).
Serverside also took issue with the Examiner's conclusion that Tuchler discloses a module configured to receive a customer identifier that corresponds to the remote customer that personalized the image, as follows:
Exhibit 5 at 11-12 (emphasis added).
Finally, for present purposes, Serverside took issue with the Examiner's conclusion that Tuchler discloses that the image processor computer comprises a module for generating the customer identifier, as follows:
Exhibit 5 at 13-14 (emphasis added).
Notwithstanding that Serverside argued that Tuchler does not disclose a "customer identifier," only a "data identifier," in a further Office Action, Iowa Defendants' Exhibit 11 — which was only submitted at the Markman hearing — the Examiner continued to describe Tuchler as disclosing a "customer identifier that corresponds to the remote customer that personalized the image." See, e.g., Exhibit 11 at 4. Nevertheless, the Examiner found allowable subject matter, as follows:
Exhibit 11 at 7-8 (emphasis added). The parties agree that the Examiner also eventually allowed the claims of the '490 patent, in portions of the prosecution history not submitted before or at the Markman hearing.
The Iowa Defendants asserted that the prosecution history and disclaimers in the prosecution history are particularly important to the proper construction of patent claim terms and patent scope. They contended that this is true in this case, because Serverside has taken positions about other claim constructions in the Delaware action, specifically, as to whether or not "financial transaction cards" in the patents-in-suit should be construed to include "bearer cards," that were inconsistent with
More specifically, the Iowa Defendants explained that, in the Office Action in new Exhibit 10, the Examiner repeatedly recognized that Tuchler teaches a "customer identifier"; that, in Serverside's responsive argument, in Exhibit 5, Serverside attempted to rebut that reading of Tuchler by asserting that Tuchler teaches a "data identifier," not a "customer identifier," but also amended the patent claims to add what is now the last limitation of claim
The Iowa Defendants pointed to new Exhibit 11, at 4, the PTO's further Office Action after Serverside's arguments in Exhibit 5, as still referring to Tuchler as disclosing a module configured to receive a "customer identifier," and making further references to a "customer identifier" in Tuchler. Thus, the Iowa Defendants argued that the PTO never accepted Serverside's distinction between a "customer identifier" and a "data identifier." Instead, they argued, the PTO allowed claim
Finally, the Iowa Defendants argued that Serverside is now trying to recapture what it disclaimed. The Iowa Defendants argued that the notice function of the patents and their prosecution history is not served by allowing such recapture.
In response, Serverside argued that claim
In rebuttal, the Iowa Defendants argued that I need not consider whether the PTO implicitly adopted Serverside's distinction between a "customer identifier" and a "data identifier," because the PTO explicitly continued to describe Tuchler as disclosing a "customer identifier" after Serverside asserted that distinction. Rather, the Iowa Defendants argued, the PTO allowed the claims after they were modified to add specific forms for the "customer identifier," demonstrating that the new claims were allowed because they disclaimed "a random alphanumeric identifier" for such a "customer identifier." The Iowa Defendants also urged me to find a disclaimer of "a random alphanumeric identifier" to keep Serverside from again changing its arguments about the meaning of claim terms. The Iowa Defendants argued that the disclaimer of "a random alphanumeric identifier" in the prosecution history at issue here is at least as clear as the disclaimer of "bearer cards" found by the Delaware court.
As I noted above, the Iowa Defendants' rationale for inserting the "not a randomly generated alphanumeric code" limitation does not depend upon the specific claim term into which the Iowa Defendants would like that limitation inserted. On the one hand, neither the portions of the prosecution history that the Iowa Defendants relied on before the Markman hearing nor the additional portions that they relied on at the Markman hearing convince me that Severside disclaimed "a randomly generated alphanumeric code" as to every form of "customer identifier." On the other hand, the parts of the prosecution history specifically brought to my attention at the Markman hearing lead me to a different conclusion as to whether or not Severside disclaimed "a randomly generated alphanumeric code" as to a particular form of "customer identifier," specifically, "encrypted customer information" — even though the parties did not assert that there should or might be different results as to different forms of "customer identifiers." My analysis of whether or not Serverside disclaimed "a randomly generated alphanumeric code" for the first and third disputed claim terms, therefore, is claim-term-by-claim-term.
I believe that an isolated question concerning insertion of the "but not a randomly generated alphanumeric code" here
As set out above, one of Serverside's responses to the Office Action in Exhibit 10, which rejected the claims of the patent application, was the following:
Exhibit 5 at 9 (underlining in the original; italics added). Although Exhibit 5 was submitted prior to my tentative draft ruling on claim construction, this passage was not pointed out to me until the Markman hearing. Furthermore, its specific effect on the third disputed claim term, "encrypted customer information," which is but one form of "customer identifier" claimed in the patents-in-suit, did not become clear to me until I considered it in the context of the parties' more general oral arguments about whether or not the "but not a randomly generated alphanumeric code" limitation should be part of the construction of any "customer identifier." I now conclude that this statement is a "`clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution'" as to "encrypted customer information," see Grober, 686 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Computer Docking Station Corp., 519 F.3d at 1374-75); 01 Communique Lab., 687 F.3d at 1297, that is, it is a clear and unmistakable disavowal of a "randomly selected alphanumeric identifier" as "encrypted customer information," on the specific ground that "random selection" is not "encryption."
Serverside's arguments that there is no disavowal of claim scope, because this statement must be read in the context of the larger dispute about whether or not Tuchler discloses a method for personalizing anything other than "bearer cards," and in the context of a dispute about whether or not Tuchler discloses "customer identifiers" at all, rather than "data identifiers," do not defeat this conclusion. In the prosecution of the patents-in-suit, Serverside argued that a "randomly selected
Consequently, I now conclude that the construction of the third disputed claim term that "stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention," and consequently, is "the correct construction" of this disputed claim term, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (stating this as the ultimate standard for claim construction), and, additionally, the construction that does not allow the patentee to recapture claim scope lost by a clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution, Grober, 686 F.3d at 1341, does require insertion of a "but not a randomly generated alphanumeric code" limitation.
Specifically, my final construction of the third disputed claim term, "encrypted customer information," is "customer information coded from original text into language unintelligible to unauthorized persons, but not into a randomly generated alphanumeric code."
In contrast, I find no "clear and unmistakable" disavowal of "a randomly generated alphanumeric code" or a "random alphanumeric identifier" as "customer identifiers" generally. Grober, 686 F.3d at 1341. I cannot find such a disclaimer where Serverside argued, repeatedly, as to "customer identifiers" generally, that Tuchler did not disclose a "customer identifier" at all, but a "data identifier." See Exhibit 5 at 10, 11-12 (quoted above). The difference between these statements and the statement that I concluded, above, disavowed "a random alphanumeric identifier" as to "encrypted customer information" is that these statements dispute not just how a customer is identified, but whether a customer is identified at all by the identifier described in Tuchler. As noted above, in the course of the prosecution of the patents, Serverside conceded, for purposes of its argument concerning "encrypted customer information," that Tuchler did disclose a "customer identifier." See Exhibit 5 at 9. Serverside did not do so as to any other "customer identifier" in any other part of the prosecution history that has been brought to my attention. The Iowa Defendants' argument that the Examiner never expressly adopted the "customer identifier"/"data identifier" distinction that Serverside asserted tells us nothing about whether or not Severside clearly and unmistakably disavowed claim scope when it insisted upon this distinction, because the issue for a disclaimer is Serverside's conduct, not the Examiner's. See Grober, 686 F.3d at 1341 (explaining that the question is whether the patentee made a "clear and unmistakable" disavowal of claim scope).
Exhibit 5 at 13-14 (emphasis added). At first blush, this statement appears to be analogous to the statement that I found was a disclaimer of "a random alphanumeric identifier" as to "encrypted customer information." A little deeper examination leads to a different conclusion, however.
As Serverside pointed out in pre-hearing briefing and at the Markman hearing, it insisted in the prosecution of the patents-in-suit that the "identifier" described in Tuchler was not a "customer identifier" at all, but a "data identifier," and the statement quoted just above is made in precisely that context, as indicated by the first sentence of the quoted paragraph. The "personalized data" to which the "random alphanumeric identifier" is assigned is described in Tuchler at paragraph [
Thus, I again conclude that this purported "disclaimer" does not even create an ambiguity about narrowing the "customer identifier," at least as claimed in the '199 patent, to exclude "a random alphanumeric code." See Elbex Video, 508 F.3d at 1371. Indeed, there is nothing resembling a "clear and unmistakable" disclaimer of a "random alphanumeric code" as a "customer identifier" within the meaning of the patents-in-suit. Grober, 686 F.3d at 1341; 01 Communique Lab., 687 F.3d at 1297.
Nevertheless, the Iowa Defendants argued at the Markman hearing that Serverside made an amendment in the course of prosecution of the application concerning what comprises a "customer identifier" by adding the last limitation of allowed claim
First, as to whether or not the presumption has arisen, I note that the Iowa Defendants have failed to point to any portion of the prosecution history that disclaims a "random alphanumeric identifier" as a "secure unique identifier" or as a "one-way code" ("hash value") or that distinguishes a "secure unique identifier" or a "one-way code" from a "random alphanumeric identifier." Indeed, in the Office Action in Exhibit 10, the Examiner apparently concluded that a "random alphanumeric identifier" is a "secure unique identifier," because the Examiner stated that claims 24 through 26 were rejected on the ground that "Tuchler discloses in paragraph 0039, that the customer identifier comprises [a] secure unique identifier," Exhibit 10 at 5, and the only "identifier" described in paragraph [
Even assuming that the presumption arises, Serverside has made a "strong showing" that rebuts it. Energy Transp. Group, 697 F.3d at 1359. Although, in Exhibit 10, the Examiner disallowed dependent claims 24 through 26 of the application, in which the "customer identifier comprises a secure unique identifier," the Examiner observed, in Exhibit 11, that application claims 24 and 25 would be allowable "if rewritten in independent form, including all of the limitations of the [rejected] base claim and any intervening claims." Exhibit 11 at 7, ¶ 8. Indeed, the Examiner explained that such an independent claim would be allowable, because prior art did not teach the specific features of application claims 24 and 25, which claimed that the "customer identifier" comprises a "secure unique identifier." Exhibit 11 at 8. This conclusion appears to be directly contrary to the Examiner's earlier conclusion in Exhibit 10 that a claim in which the "customer identifier comprises a secure unique identifier" is not patentable over Tuchler. What changed between Exhibit 10 and Exhibit 11, then, must be the Examiner's belief that Tuchler disclosed a "secure unique identifier" by disclosing a "random alphanumeric identifier."
Moreover, as Serverside argued, claim
Thus, I now conclude that the construction of the second disputed claim term, "customer identifier that corresponds to the remote customer that personalized said image," that "stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention," and consequently, is "the correct construction" of this disputed claim term, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (stating this as the ultimate standard for claim construction), and, additionally, the construction that does not allow the patentee to recapture claim scope lost by a clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution, Grober, 686 F.3d at 1341, or a narrowing amendment to obtain patentability, see Energy Transp. Group, 697 F.3d at 1359, does not require insertion of a "but not a randomly generated alphanumeric code" limitation.
Thus, my final construction of the first disputed claim term, "customer identifier that corresponds to the remote customer that personalized said image," is the same as my tentative construction, "a signal, character, or group of characters that matches with the customer that personalized the image."
Upon the foregoing, I construe the "undisputed" claim terms at issue in this patent infringement action as shown in the following chart:
UNDISPUTED CLAIM TERMS Claim Relevant Agreed No. Term/Phrase Claim(s) Construction 1 "financial transaction card" '199: 1, 2, 9, "a transaction card (e.g., credit 14-16, 18, card, debit card, ATM card, or similar 22, 25, 29 card), but not a prepaid bearer card" '490: 1, 2, 9, 14-16, 18, 22, 25, 29-31 2 "financial record of the remote customer '199: 1 '490: "record of financial information of that personalized the image" 1: the customer that personalized the image" 3 "one-way code" '199: 1 "a hash value created from customer information" 4 "image processing means for providing '490: 30-31 Means plus function term, with the an image, produced based function being "providing an image, on said instructions for manipulation, based on instructions for manipulation, for application to the financial for application to the financial transaction card" transaction card," and the associated structure being "an image processor (see, e.g., back end software 110 and image manipulation emulator 256)" 5 "means for embedding the customer '199: 25 Means plus function term, with the identifier in the personalized image" '490: 25 function being "embedding the customer identifier in the personalized
image" and the associated structure being "a back end server (such as server 1103 or 1203) that embeds the customer identifier in the personalized image, for example by embedding the identifier in a bar code, machine readable code, or metadata" 6 "computer program means for presenting '199: 30 The three phrases are means plus to a remote customer the '490: 30-31 function claim terms, with the function remote user interface" being "presenting to a remote customer or remote user a user interface" and the associated structure being "a user interface (see, e.g., front end software 105 and Figs. 3-10)" "computer program means for presenting to a remote customer a user interface" "computer program means for presenting to a remote user an user interface" 7 "image instruction means for receiving '199: 30 The phrase is a means plus function instructions for manipulation '490: 30-31 claim term, with the function being of an image file" "receiving instructions for manipulation of an image file" and the associated structure being "an image compilation server coupled to a communications link (see, e.g., image compilation server 108)" 8 "an identifier selected from a secure '199: 1 "a customer identifier that is chosen unique identifier and a one-way from one of two available options: code" a secure unique identifier or a one-way code" 9 "instructions defining said plurality '199: 29 "instructions for implementing all of manipulations applied to the '490: 29 of the manipulations that a remote graphical representation" user applies to a graphical representation on a remote terminal"
Upon the foregoing, I also construe the "disputed" claim terms at issue in this patent infringement action as shown in the following chart:
DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS Iowa Iowa Defendants' Defendants' Court's Serversude's Proposed Court's Claim Relevant Proposed Proposed Tentative Revised Final No. Term/Phrase Claim(s) Construction Construction Construction Construction 10 Construction 1 "customer '199: 1-4, No construction A unique code, "a signal, character "a unique signal, "a signal, identifier 6-8 required but not a randomly or group character, or character, or that 10-13, 15, generated of characters group of characters, group of characters corresponds 17-18 alphanumeric that matches but not a that to 20-21 code, with the consonalized the randomly generated matches with
mote customer there- 24-28 image" generated by tom tomer that per-that that personalized performing a ic code, that personalized said image" transformation matches with the the image" on a customer's customer that financial personalized the account information, image" such as the customer's name or account number, but not generated using information provided by the customer. "customber '490: 1-7, If construed, identifier 6-8 then: information corresponding 10-13, 15, used to to the 17-18, identified the remote remote 20-21, customer customer"/customer 24-28, or user." identifier 30-31 that corresponds to the remote customer" 2 "secure '199:1 No construction Indefinite. "a secure, "a secure, unique required. unique signal, unique signal, identifier" character, or character, or group of characters group of characters that can that be used to identify can be used to the customer" identify the customer" If construed, In the alternative, then: "unique if not identifier which indefinite: "encrypted is secure" information." 3 "encrypted customer '490: 1, No construction "a unique code, "customer information "customer information information"/"encrypted 29-31 required. but not coded coded remote a randomly from original from original text user information" generated alphanumeric test into language into unique language code, generated that is unintelligirized within a secure unintelligible to persons, but environment by unauthorized not into a randomly performing a persons" generated transformation alphanumeric on a customer's code" financial account information" If construed, then: "customer or remote user information which has been encrypted or encoded"
Jason M. Nolan, Formalism And Patent Claim Drafting: The Status Of De Facto Independent Claims Under The Fourth Paragraph Of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 263, 275 (Winter 2011) (footnote omitted) (proposing "a definition for independent claim that would reduce ambiguity in claim construction, eliminate one of the contradictory definitions, and restore the contrary relationship between independent and dependent claims"). This commentator proposes defining an "independent" claim as "complete in itself without reference to another claim." Id. at 294.
My explanation of an "independent" claim here, on the other hand, considers the possibility that a claim may be independent if it does not require another claim as its starting point, but merely incorporates by reference the subject matter of another claim as one of its limitations, more in keeping with one of the definitions cited by the commentator. I do not, however, take a firm position on the matter. This issue may be of more than academic interest here — eventually, if not immediately — because Serverside asserts that "claims 1 and 29 of the '199 patent, and claims 1 and 29-31 of the '490 patent, are independent," Plaintiffs' Opening Brief at 3, notwithstanding that claim
Raylon, L.L.C. v. Complus Data Innovations, Inc., 700 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2012). Some of the claim constructions proffered in this case may be perilously close to this "reasonableness" limit.
A structure disclosed in the specification qualifies as a "corresponding structure" if the specification or the prosecution history "clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim." B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed.Cir.1997). Even if the specification discloses a "corresponding structure," the disclosure must be adequate; the patent's specification must provide "an adequate disclosure showing what is meant by that [claim] language. If an applicant fails to set forth an adequate disclosure, the applicant has in effect failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as required by the second paragraph of section 112." In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed.Cir.1994) (en banc). Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 and ¶ 6, therefore, "a means-plus-function clause is indefinite if a person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding function in the claim." AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc'ns., Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1241 (Fed.Cir.2007) (citing Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1381-82 (Fed.Cir.1999)).
Noah Sys., 675 F.3d at 1311-12. Here, however, Serverside contends that Judge Andrews has construed the only means-plus-function claim terms at issue in this case in the Delaware action, so that I need not do so.